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Abstract—In this paper, we incorporate the realistic scenario
of key protection into link privacy preserving and propose the
target-link privacy preserving (TPP) model: target links referred
to as targets are the most important and sensitive objectives
that would be intentionally attacked by adversaries, in order
that need privacy protections, while other links of less privacy
concerns are properly released to maintain the graph utility.
The goal of TPP is to limit the target disclosure by deleting
a budget limited set of alternative non-target links referred to
as protectors to defend the adversarial link predictions for all
targets. Traditional link privacy preserving treated all links as
targets and concentrated on structural level protections in which
serious link disclosure and high graph utility loss is still the
bottleneck of graph releasing today, while TPP focuses on the
target level protections in which key protection is implemented
on a tiny fraction of critical targets to achieve better privacy
protection and lower graph utility loss. Currently there is a lack
of clear TPP problem definition, provable optimal or near optimal
protector selection algorithms and scalable implementations on
large-scale social graphs.
Firstly, we introduce the TPP model and propose a dissimilar-
ity function used for measuring the defense ability against privacy
analyzing for the targets. We consider two different problems by
budget assignment settings: 1) we protect all targets and to opti-
mize the dissimilarity of all targets with a single budget; 2) besides
the protections of all targets, we also care about the protection of
each target by assigning a local budget to every target. Moreover,
we propose two local protector selections, namely cross-target
and with-target pickings. Each problem with each protector
picking selection is corresponding to a greedy algorithm. We also
implement scalable implementations for all greedy algorithms by
limiting the selection scale of protectors, and we prove that all
greedy-based algorithms achieve approximation by holding the
monotonicity and submodularity. Through experiments on large
real social graphs, we demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency
of the proposed target link protection methods.
Index Terms—Target Privacy Preserving, Link Deletion, Bud-
get, Graph Utility.
I. INTRODUCTION
Links of a social graph are rich of private contact behaviors
(e.g. private friendship and confidential financial transactions
between two users), and the link disclosure heavily imperils
the individual privacy concerns such as the user deanonymiza-
tion [1]. In this sense, link anonymization is more fundamental
than user anonymization, which is the focus of this work.
Traditional link privacy preserving technologies [1]–[10] such
as structure perturbations, graph generations and differential
privacy provide structural level protections in which all links
are treated to be sensitive and extensively perturbed to defend
the adversarial attacks. Unfortunately, it is very difficult in
protecting all links, and serious link disclosure is still the
bottleneck of graph structure releasing today.
In practice, only a limited number of links are significantly
important. In a social graph, individuals often like to share
most of their social links with other individuals and inten-
tionally hide several private links such as a link that as a
patient a person visited a cancer doctor. The disclosure of
these important links often leads to serious security disasters
(e.g. privacy disclosure, economic loss or even life threats). If
the link that the patient visited the cancer doctor is exposed,
the attackers will infer that the patient got cancer which
is the very sensitive privacy for the patient. For another
instance, a terrorist might extensively analyze the social links
to kidnap one or more important hostages (e.g. the parents,
spouse, sons/daughters, and important friends or cooperators)
to directly threaten a victim. Thus, it is badly in need of
protections of these important but vulnerable links (“targets”)
against the advanced link privacy analyzing methods, and
for security purpose, it is not surprising that lots of users
hide their important and sensitive relationship links in social
graphs such as Facebook and Wechat. However, although the
target links are eliminated before graph structure releasing,
attackers have the ability of remarkably inferring the missing
targets by analyzing the building principles of the graph. Then
some other non-target links referred to as protectors should be
properly deleted to help targets hide better. Then our work is
that instead of protecting all links we choose to intensively
provide privacy protections for these most important and
sensitive targets to satisfy the urgent needs of social graphs.
We model the above scenario by the Target Privacy Preserv-
ing (TPP) task. A social graph can be defined as G “ pV,Eq,
where V is the node set and E is the edge set. T is defined as
the target set, which is a subset of E. TPP can be accomplished
by two phases. In phase-1, all targets are eliminated to hide
themselves first, namely E “ EzT . In phase-2, an increase
dissimilarity function fpP, T q is introduced to quantify the
defense ability of TPP against target attacks, where P pP Ď Eq
is the set of protectors which are efficiently selected to
optimize the dissimilarity function. The goal of TPP is with a
limited budget k which is the maximum deletion number of
links, to optimally select protectors for set P (|P | ď k) which
maximally promotes the dissimilarity scores for all targets.
TPP is a new privacy model and differs from the traditional
link privacy preserving, which focuses on target level privacy
protections for key targets to satisfy more practical privacy
needs of current social graphs.
Budget is a critical constrain of dissimilarity function, and
we study two scenarios for budget assignments. (1) All targets
share a global budget. Every protector is iteratively selected as
the one that increases the dissimilarity of all targets most. We
design a greedy algorithm to achieve an 1´1{e approximation
of optimal solution. (2) Every target t is assigned a sub budget
kt which is mainly used to protect itself and additionally help
other targets. To this end, we design two kinds of general
protector selections. The first cross-target greedy algorithm
globally selects protector cross different targets and achieves
an approximation ratio 1{2. The second within-target greedy
algorithm selects protectors target by target and achieve an
approximation ratio 0.46.
We further do scalable implementations for all greedy
algorithms to run in large-scale social graphs. We conduct
experiments on many real social graphs to demonstrate the
effectiveness of our methods. We compare the similarity score
evolutions for all link deletion methods with two related base-
lines. With limited deletion budget, the global budget based
greedy algorithm can achieve the best protections. We further
analyze the graph utility loss to demonstrate the effectiveness
of TPP solutions.
The contributions of this work are: (a) mathematically
defining a new TPP problem and a dissimilarity function; (b)
theoretically proving that the optimal protector selection is NP-
hard for TPP and the objective functions are monotone and
submodular; (c) proposing three greedy algorithms for three
different protector selection scenarios under two budget as-
signment settings; (d) scalable implementations for all greedy
algorithms to run on large-scale social graphs; (e) conducting
experiments on many real social graphs to demonstrate the
effectiveness and efficiency of proposed algorithms.
II. RELATED WORK
Many related link privacy preserving technologies have
been proposed to limit the link disclosures. Structure per-
turbations [1]–[5] mainly employed randomization algorithms
to rewire/switch the real links into fake ones to cheat or
defend adversarial link predictions [1], [5], [11]–[13]. Graph
generation methods [14]–[19] sampled many important graph
characteristics (e.g. degree distributions and degree correla-
tions) based on which a serial of pseudo graphs was generated
to represent the original one. Thus, the structure privacy can
be to some extend preserved. Differential privacy mechanisms
[7]–[9], [20], [21] provided the queries of edge, node, or
subgraphs to satisfy ǫ-differential privacy in which given the
maximum background knowledge an attacker can’t infer the
existence of a given edge, node or subgraph respectively.
Furthermore, the global [10] and local [22] differential privacy
based graph generations can yield pseudo graphs for privacy
protection purpose. Others such as k-means clustering [23],
k-isomorphism [6], [24], k-anonymity [25] and L-opacity [26]
can also protect subgraph related structure privacy. However,
these methods didn’t consider target-level privacy protections.
Related link deletion method for privacy preserving is rare,
which is often a step for link switching methods [3], [27].
III. PRIVACY MODEL AND PROBLEM DEFINITION
Talbe I lists the main mathematical notations of this work.
TABLE I
THE MAIN MATHEMATICAL NOTATIONS USED IN THIS WORK.
Symbol Definition
G The social graph
V; E The set of vertices/nodes; The set of edges/links
T The set of target links
P The set of protectors
t A target
p A protector
Pt The set of protectors for target t
spP, tq Similarity of t when deleting P protectors
spP, T q Total similarity of T targets when deleting P protectors
fpP, T q Total dissimilarity of T targets when deleting P protectors
C A constant number for the dissimilarity function
k The link deletion budget
k˚ The critical budget that provides full privacy protection
kt The sub budget for target t
K The sub budget vector for all targets
Wt The set of target subgraphs for target t
W The set of all target subgraphs for all targets
∆p The dissimilarity gain if deleting p in the SGB-Greedy
∆tp
Dissimilarity gain if deleting p for t in the WT-Greedy
and CT-Greedy algorithms
A. Target Privacy Preserving Model
The design of TPP is to efficiently defend some specific
adversarial link predictions. In this work, we mainly focused
on the subgraph pattern or motif [28] based link prediction. In
general, a missing link is predictable attributing to its frequent
participation into a specific subgraph pattern or motif [28]
which is the building principle of most real social graphs.
Based on the principle, adversaries can infer the missing tar-
gets and disclose the privacy. The Triangle motif as shown in
Fig. 1(a) has been widely used for link predictions. If two ends
of a missing link can communicate to each other via at least
one 2-length paths, the existing probability for the missing
link is proportional to the number of 2-length paths between
the two ends. It is the basis of common neighbor related link
predictions. To extend, if the two ends of a missing link are
routed by multiple 3-length paths, we can also infer that there
is an existing probability for the missing link. For instance, in
a social graph, if two users are initially not friends, but the
friends of the two users are strongly connected, there exists
a high probability of building friendship introduced by the
friends of friends. This case is based on the Rectangle motif
as shown in Fig. 1(b). Furthermore, the missing link might
frequently participate into some complex patterns, for instance
in Fig. 1(c). In this pattern, the two users are simultaneously
and indirectly connected by a 2-length path and a 3-length path
which shares an intermediate node with the 2-length path, and
we treat this pattern as RecTri motif which can be considered
as a classical representation of complex patterns. In fact, it
is general to use any motif as link prediction basis in TPP.
Without loss of generality and for simplicity, in this work we
use Triangle, Rectangle and RecTri as three motif instances.
A subgraph is regarded as a target subgraph denoted by wt
for a target t together with which it is in the form of focused
motif such as Triangle, Rectangle, and RecTri in Fig. 1. For
a specific subgraph pattern, we denote all target subgraphs
for target t by Wt in the graph. Because all targets have
been removed in phase-1, in phase-2 a target subgraph can
be only included in one target subgraph set, namely for any
two target subgraph sets Wt and Wt1 , Wt XWt1 “ H. The
number of target subgraphs for a target t is generally referred
to as similarity denoted by spP, tq “ |Wt| for t, where a
higher similarity of a target link means higher probability
being inferred. The total similarity for all targets is defined
as spP, T q “ řtPT spP, tq, which is the vulnerability of being
attacked for all targets. Meanwhile, we define a dissimilarity
function fpP, T q “ C´spP, T q to indicate the attack defense
ability of all targets against link predictions, where C is
a constant and large number satisfying C ě spH, T q and
fpP, T q ě 0, and higher dissimilarity means lower probability
of being inferred or attacked for all targets. The fpP, T q
is an increase function of monotonicity and submodularity.
A protector might participate in multiple target subgraphs,
for instance protector p3 in Fig. 2(a) included in two target
subgraphs. Deleting the protector (e.g. p3) can increase the
dissimilarity score by equal number of the broken target sub-
graphs (e.g. 2 for deleting p3). The task of TPP is to optimally
select protectors for set P p|P | ď kq which maximizes the
dissimilarity function fpP, T q.
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Fig. 1. The illustrations and examples for the proof of submodularity for the
dissimilarity function by using the three classical subgraph patterns: Triangle,
Rectangle, and RecTri.
The fpP, T q is strongly limited by the budget, namely
|P | ď k. We consider two budget-related TPP problems in
the following sub Sec. III-C and III-D.
B. Threat Model
We assume the adversarial attackers have the full knowledge
of the privacy-preserved graph based on which the attackers
predict the existence of these hidden links (i.e. targets) by em-
ploying a specific link prediction method (e.g. subgraph-based
link prediction) or link inference (e.g. Bayesian inference).
C. Single-Global-Budget based TPP Problem (SGBT)
All targets share a single global budget k, and up to k
protectors are globally selected and eliminated through up to
k iterations. We aim to find a such protector set P that can
achieve the maximal dissimilarity scores.
Definition 1. The TPP under Single-Global-Budget condi-
tion is the optimization task where inputs include the graph
G “ pV,Eq, the target set T , and budget k. The goal is to
find a protector set P (|P | ď k) such that the dissimilarity
fpP, T q “ C ´řtPT spP, tq is maximized.
Theorem 1. The optimal protector set selection for SGBT
problem is NP-hard.
Proof (Sketch). All target subgraphs for all targets is
denoted by W “ ŤtPT Wt. A protector p might participate
in multiple target subgraphs. Deleting the protector p (p P E)
might break a set Qp (Qp ĎW ) of target subgraphs. To max-
imize the dissimilarity of all targets is to maximally break the
target subgraphs with a limited deletion budget k. Assuming
every link in E can be considered as one protector, and we
have the set Q “ tQp|p P Eu. Our aim is converted to find a
subfamily P (|P | ď k, P Ď E) to achieve max(|ŤpPP Qp|).
It is the traditional Max-k-Cover problem [29] for which the
optimal solution is NP-hard.
D. Multi-Local-Budget based TPP Problem (MLBT)
Every target t is assigned a sub budget kt (0 ď kt ď k),
and K “ tkt|t P T u is the set of all sub budgets. The budget
kt is used for preserving the privacy of target t.
Definition 2. The TPP under Multi-Local-Budget condition
is the optimization task where inputs include the graph G “
pV,Eq, the target set T , and sub budget set K . The goal is to
find |T | sub protector sets of which each set Pt (|Pt| ď kt) for
target t and the set P “ ŤtPT Pt, such that the dissimilarity
function fpP, T q “ C ´řtPT spPt, T q is maximized.
Theorem 2. The optimal protector set selection for MLBT
problem is NP-hard.
Proof (Sketch). Like the Theorem 1, every deleted protector
p for any target can break a set Qp (Qp Ď W ) of target
subgraphs. The goal is to find the Max-k-Covers [29]. Then
the optimal protector selection for MLBT is also NP-hard.
IV. OPTIMAL SOLUTION FOR THE SGBT PROBLEM
After deleting all targets from the edge list of original graph,
one specific target subgraph such as Triangle can only include
one target. Every target subgraph in W only serves for one
target. Meanwhile, every removable protector might serve for
multiple targets, or a protector might participate in multiple
target subgraphs for one target.
Lemma 1. The dissimilarity function fpP, T q of SGBT is
monotone, for any set relation A Ď B Ď P , fpA, T q ď
fpB, T q.
Proof. By Definition 1,
fpA, T q ´ fpB, T q “ řtPT spB, tq ´
ř
tPT spA, tq “ř
tPT pspB, tq ´ spA, tqq
Without loss of generality, we assume B “ AY tpu, then
fpA, T q ´ fpB, T q “ řtPT pspAY tpu, tq ´ spA, tqq
For any target t, there are at most two cases for a new
deleted protector p.
Case 1. Protector p is included in at least one target
subgraph of Wt. In this case, one or more subgraphs will be
broken from the graph, and the number of target subgraphs
for target t decreases, namely spAY tpu, tq ´ spA, tq ă 0.
Case 2. Protector p is not included in any target subgraph
of Wt, then spAY tpu, tq ´ spA, tq “ 0.
Then for any target t, the spA Y tpu, tq ´ spA, tq ď 0 can
be guaranteed, so we can infer that
ř
tPT pspA Y tpu, tq ´
spA, tqq ď 0, namely fpA, T q ´ fpB, T q ď 0. The mono-
tonicity is proved.
Lemma 2. The dissimilarity function fpP, T q of SGBT is
submodular, for the sets A Ď B Ď P , fpA Y tpu, T q ´
fpA, T q ě fpB Y tpu, T q ´ fpB, T q, where p P EzB.
Proof. By Definition 1
∆fpA, T q “ fpA Y tpu, T q ´ fpA, T q “ řtPT pspA, tq ´
spAY tpu, tqq
Similarly, ∆fpB, T q “ fpB Y tpu, T q ´ fpB, T q “ř
tPT pspB, tq ´ spB Y tpu, tqq
In fact, ∆fpA, T q and ∆fpB, T q are the reduced number
of target subgraphs if a protector p is deleted from graph G “
pV,EzAq and G “ pV,EzBq respectively.
Without loss of generality, here we assume B “ A Y txu,
where x is a deleted protector in B but not in A. For any target
t, there are at most four cases for the location combinations
of protector p and x in any target subgraph pattern as shown
in Fig. 1.
Case 1. Both protector p and x are not the edges of any
target subgraph for target t, for instance in Fig. 1(a1) for Tri-
angle subgraph p “ p2 and x “ p1, then∆fpA, tq “ spA, tq´
spAYtpu, tq “ 0 and ∆fpB, tq “ spB, tq´spBYtpu, tq “ 0.
∆fpA, tq “ ∆fpB, tq “ 0.
Case 2. Both p and x are the edges of any given target
subgraph for target t, still taking Triangle for example in
Fig. 1(a2) x “ p3, p “ p4. For set A, link x is still in its
target subgraph, deleting protector p will lead to∆fpA, tq “ 1.
Meanwhile, if link x is deleted in advance in set B, deleting
protector p will lead to ∆fpB, tq “ 0. It can be seen that
∆fpA, tq ą ∆fpB, tq.
Case 3. Protector p included in at least one target subgraph
of target t, and x beyond any target subgraph of target t, for
instance in Fig. 1(a3), x “ p2 and p “ p4, then we have
∆fpA, tq “ ∆fpB, tq “ 1.
Case 4. Link p and x are beyond and in any target subgraph
of target t respectively. As in Fig. 1(a4) for Triangle pattern,
we randomly set x “ p4 and p “ p2, and then we have
∆fpA, tq “ ∆fpB, tq “ 0.
Thus, we can see that for all the four cases discussed above,
for any target t P T , the equation ∆fpA, tq ě ∆fpB, tq
can be absolutely guaranteed. Then we have ∆fpA, T q “ř
tPT ∆fpA, tq , ∆fpB, T q “
ř
tPT ∆fpB, tq, and it can
be inferred that ∆fpA, T q ě ∆fpB, T q. The submodularity
property of the dissimilarity function fpP, T q is proved.
Theorem 3. The SGBT can yield an 1´ 1{e approximation
of the optimal solution.
Proof (Sketch). SGBT is converted to the classical Set
Cover [29] problem which has monotonicity and submodu-
larity property. It has been proved that the greedy solution for
set cover has an 1´ 1{e approximation of optimal solution.
Then the SGBT problem can be solved by employing
a greedy algorithm to achieve a near optimal solution. At
every step, the number of broken target subgraphs for every
alternative link in the graph is computed, and we select the
link as a protector which can break the highest number of
target subgraphs for all targets. The process can be described
by Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: SGB-Greedy: The Single-Global-Budget
Greedy Protector Selection Algorithm
Input: Graph G “ pV,Eq, target set T , and budget k.
Output: The protector set P
P “ H ;
while |P | ă k do
foreach p P E do
estimate ∆p “ fpP Y tpu, T q ´ fpP, T q ;
find p˚ Ð argmaxpPE∆p ;
if ∆p˚ ““ 0 then
return;
P “ P Y tp˚u ;
E “ Eztp˚u;
In the Algorithms 1, for each selected protector, the dis-
similarity gains of all alternative links are recalculated. The
time complexity for calculating the similarity score spP, tq
is to search the number of target subgraphs it participates
in. For different subgraph patterns, the time complexity is
different. For the motif instances used in this work, the
similarity calculating time complexity for any target t “ pu, vq
is Opdudvq where du and dv are the degrees of node u and v
respectively. In general, the degree of a node is proportional to
logN where N is the networks size [16]. The time complexity
for calculating the dissimilarity score is OpnplogNq2q where
n is the number of targets. At each step, every link is tried
as a protector, and the time complexity is OpmnplogNq2q.
Total time complexity for selecting at most k protectors is
OpkmnplogNq2q.
V. OPTIMAL SOLUTION FOR THE MLBT PROBLEM
In real application settings, relationship strengths between
all pairs of nodes are heterogeneous, and the importance level
of every sensitive target is different. For a graph releaser, with
a finite budget k, it is critical to primarily protect the privacy of
more important targets and assign higher budget for them. In
general, with a total budget k, based on a specific assignment
strategy, every target t is assigned a sub budget ktp
ř
tPT kt ď
kq. Budget kt is mainly used for the target t. The set Pt is a
subset of set P and contains the alternative protectors that can
significantly reduce the target subgraphs in Wt. A protector
in Pt also can help other targets break their target subgraphs.
Then for multi-local-budget TPP problem, it still needs global
graph structure to globally pick alternative protectors for all
targets.
Lemma 3. For MLBT problem in Definition 2, the dissim-
ilarity function fpP, T q “ C ´ řtPT spPt, T q is monotone,
For any t, At Ď Bt Ď Pt, A “
Ť
tPT At, B “
Ť
tPT Bt,
fpA, T q ď fpB, T q.
Proof. By Definition 2
fpA, T q ´ fpB, T q “ řtPT pspBt, T q ´ spAt, T qq
By Lemma 1, for any target t, the sets satisfy At Ď Bt Ď Pt,
we have spBt, T q ´ spAt, T q ď 0
Then for all targets, we have
ř
tPT pspBt, T q´ spAt, T qq ď
0. Thus, the monotonicity property is proved.
Lemma 4. For MLBT problem in Definition 2, the dissim-
ilarity function fpP, T q “ C ´řtPT spPt, T q is submodular.
For any target t, At Ď Bt Ď Pt, A “
Ť
tPT At, B “
Ť
tPT Bt,
fpAY tpu, T q ´ fpA, T q ě fpB Y tpu, T q ´ fpB, T q.
Proof. By Definition 2
∆fpA, T q “ fpAY tpu, T q´ fpA, T q “ řtPT pspAt, T q ´
spAt Y tpu, T qq
Similarly, ∆fpB, T q “ řtPT pspBt, T q ´ spBt Y tpu, T qq
By Lemma 2, for any target t, if At Ď Bt Ď Pt, we have
spAt, T q ´ spAt Y tpu, T q ě spBt, T q ´ spBt Y tpu, T q
Then for all targets, we have ∆fpA, T q ě ∆fpB, T q.
Therefore, the submodularity is proved. For the problem in
Definition 2, there are two aspects to be properly solved. 1)
Budget division, where the sub budget for every target is given.
2) How to select protectors for every target to achieve the most
dissimilarity increase?
A. Budget Division Strategies
We consider two categories of budget division methods.
Firstly, for any target t, kt ď |Wt| is constricted. A target of
more target subgraphs needs more budget to protect its privacy.
The sub budget kt for a target t can be designed proportionally
to the number of target subgraphs for target t, and it is denoted
as the target-subgraph-based budget division (TBD).
Every link is often related to its two ends. The degree
product of the two ends can also be considered as the metric
of link importance in the network. Assuming the degree of the
two ends (i.e. u and v) of any target t as du and dv respectively,
the budget kt for any target t can be defined proportional to
the degree product of the two ends. It is called as the degree-
product-based budget division (DBD) strategy.
For MLBT problem, when selecting an alternative protector
to remove, there are two considerations: 1) local budget kt is
mainly used for decreasing the target subgraphs for the target
t, and 2) it may also help other targets to break their target
subgraphs. Given a local budget division K , there are two
settings for protector picking: Cross-Target setting and Within-
Target setting.
B. Cross-Target Protector Selection for MLBT
For cross-target protector selection, given a set P which is
partitioned into disjoint sets P1,P2,. . . ,Pn and I “ tX Ď P :
|X X Pt| ď kt,@t P T u, pP, Iq is called a partition matroid
[30], [31]. We use pair pt, pq to denote deleting a link p for
target t. For every target and every protector, the scores are
calculated, and we select the one whose deletion increase the
dissimilarity score most. The protector selection crosses all
the targets whose budgets are not used up. ∆tp represents the
total increased dissimilarity score by deleting a protector p for
target t. ∆tp includes two parts of dissimilarity increasement:
1) spPt, tq´spPtYtpu, tq indicates the number of broken target
subgraphs in the Wt for this target; 2)
ř
t1PT zttupspPt, t1q ´
spPt Y tpu, t1qq is the number of broken target subgraphs for
other targets. Such case may exist that ∆tp “ 1` 4 where the
protector p breaks 1 target subgraph in Wt, and 4 in W zWt,
while ∆tp “ 2 ` 2 where the protector p1 breaks 2 target
subgraph in Wt, and 2 in W zWt. Although the protector p
breaks more total target subgraphs than p1, but p1 breaks more
target subgraphs for the target t and should be chosen. It is
described by Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2: CT-Greedy: The Cross-Target Greedy Pro-
tector Selection Algorithm
Input: Graph G “ pV,Eq, target set T , budget k,
K “ TBDpk,W q or DBDpk,W, dsq.
Output: The protector set P
P “ H ;
foreach p P E do
Pt “ H ;
T 1 ÐH; //the set of targets whose budgets are used up
foreach t P T do
foreach t P T zT 1, p P E do
estimate ∆tp “ spPt, tq ´ spPt Y tpu, tq `ř
t1PT ztturspPt, t1q ´ spPt Y tpu, t1qs{C ;
pt˚, p˚q Ð argmaxtPT zT 1,pPE∆tp ;
if ∆t
˚
p˚ ““ 0 then
return;
if |Pt˚ | ě kt˚ then
T 1 Ð T 1 Y tt˚u ;
Pt˚ “ Pt˚ Y tp˚u; ;
E “ Eztp˚u;
For the CT-Greedy algorithm, for each pt, pq, all links in
E are used, and the time complexity is also OpmnplogNq2q.
The total time complexity is OpknmplogNq2q too.
Theorem 4. The CT-Greedy algorithm can achieve an ap-
proximation 1{2 of the optimal solution.
Proof (Sketch). As discussed above, the cross-target set-
ting is an instance of submodular maximization of partition
matroid, and the performance of CT-Greedy satisfies the
guarantee [30], [31]. Then the final output of CT-Greedy can
achieve at least 1{2 approximation of the optimal solution.
C. Within-Target Protector Selection for MLBT
For within-target scenario, we can greedily pick protectors
for the first target. After the first target satisfied, the second
target is greedily satisfied, until sub budgets of all targets are
used up. The process can be described by Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3: WT-Greedy: The Within-Target Greedy Pro-
tector Selection Algorithm
Input: Graph G “ pV,Eq, target set T , budget k,
K “ TBDpk,W q or DBDpk,W, dsq.
Output: The protector set P
P “ H ;
foreach @p P E do
Pt “ H ;
foreach t P T do
for b “ 1, 2, 3, ¨ ¨ ¨ , kt do
foreach t P T zT 1, p P E do
estimate ∆tp “ spPt, tq ´ spPt Y tpu, tq `ř
t1PT ztturspPt, t1q ´ spPt Y tpu, t1qs{C ;
pt, p˚q Ð argmaxtPT zT 1,pPE∆tp ;
if ∆tp˚ ““ 0 then
return;
Pt “ Pt Y tp˚u; ;
E “ Eztp˚u;
In Algorithm 3, within each target t of sub budget kt, the
time complexity is OpktmnplogNq2q. For all targets, the total
time complexity is OpmnplogNq2řtPT ktq.
Theorem 5. The WT-Greedy algorithm can achieve an
approximation 1´ e´p1´1{eq of the optimal solution.
Proof (Sketch). The within-target setting is also an instance
of submodular maximization for picking the protectors re-
stricted by the local budget for every target link. It has been
extensively discussed in [30], [31], and the bound has been
proved to be 1´ e´p1´1{eq. Therefore, the WT-Greedy in our
work can achieve an approximation ratio 1´ e´p1´1{eq.
The SGB-Greedy globally uses the budget. The CT-Greedy
can select every protector globally cross all targets for the tar-
get who still has budget. The WT-Greedy only pick protectors
within a given target. For these three settings, in Fig. 2, we
give an example (using the Triangle pattern) to illustrate the
comparisons of these methods. In Fig. 2(a), there are 5 targets
in this example, and link p1 participates in 2 target triangles
for target t1 and t2; link p2 in 3 target triangles for t3, t4 and
t2; link p3 in 2 target triangles for t4 and t5. We assume the
total budget is 2 and assign sub budget 1 for t1 and t2 (others
0) under CT-Greedy and WT-Greedy. By SGB-Greedy, two
protectors are selected as p2 and p3 in Fig. 2(b) and Fig. 2(c)
respectively. The increased dissimilarity score is 5. By CT-
Greedy, the increased score is 4, by deleting p2 and p1 for
target t2 and t1 in Fig. 2(d) and Fig. 2(e) respectively. By
WT-Greedy, the increased score is 3, deleting p1 and p4 for
target t1 and t2 in Fig. 2(f) and Fig. 2(g) respectively.
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Fig. 2. An example to illustrate the difference among the SGB-Greedy,
CT-Greedy, and WT-Greedy algorithms.
D. Scalable Implementations
In the above SGB-Greedy, CT-Greedy, and WT-Greedy
algorithms, for every protector selection, the increased dis-
similarity scores of all alternative links in the network are
computed. In real large social graphs such as the Facebook, it
is very time-consuming to estimate the dissimilarity scores for
all links. In fact, only the links that participate in the target
subgraphs can break target sub-graphs.
Lemma 5. The alternative protectors are restricted to these
links of target subgraphs.
Proof (Sketch). It is straightforward, because deleting links
beyond the target subgraphs won’t change the number of target
subgraphs.
It is straightforward to reduce the time consumption of all
proposed algorithms by employing Lemma 5. The protector
selection scale is extensively reduced. The above three greedy
algorithms under the restricted condition in Lemma 5 are re-
ferred to as SGB-Greedy-R, CT-Greedy-R and WT-Greedy-R
for the SGB-Greedy, CT-Greedy and WT-Greedy respectively.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
A. Baselines
To our best knowledge, our work is the first to study the
target privacy preserving problem. There is no available related
baseline to use, so we design two related baselines.
1) Random deletions (RD). It is the simplest baseline by
randomly removing a given number k of links from the edge
set E.
2) Random deletions from target subgraphs (RDT). This
baseline is to randomly select k links from many of the target
subgraphs.
B. Datasets
In this work, without loss of generality, we use two widely
used datasets of social graphs in our experiments.
Arenas-email1. This is the email communication network
at the University Rovira i Virgili in Tarragona in the south of
Catalonia in Spain. Nodes are users, and every edge represents
that at least one email was sent between the pair of users.
Because the direction or the number of emails is not stored,
this network is unweighted and undirected, including 1133
nodes and 5451 links.
DBLP2. This network is a co-authorship network. Nodes
are authors, and each edge represents that the two authors co-
authored and published at least one paper together. There are
317080 nodes, and 1049866 edges.
C. Results
Without loss of generality, the targets are randomly sam-
pled from the existing links of the original graph. We first
delete these targets from the edge list, and then we run the
SGB-Greedy, WT-Greedy, WT-Greedy and relative scalable
algorithms (i.e. SGB-Greedy-R, WT-Greedy-R, WT-Greedy-
R) separately on a server of 128G RAM. We run every
algorithm on at least 10 independent target samplings.
Evolution of the number of target subgraphs. Deleting
protectors will cause the increase of dissimilarity scores. In
fact, it can be alternatively represented by the similarity which
is easy to be observed and understood for result analysis,
where lower total similarity means better privacy protection
for all targets. We set the number of targets |T | “ 20, and
take budget k as a variable for three subgraph patterns. In
Fig. 3, on the original Arenas-email graph, spH, T q=48, 532,
and 209 for the Triangle, Rectangle, and RecTri respectively.
Higher spH, T q means higher challenge to defend the specific
adversarial link predictions. The Rectangle motif based TPP
seems more challenging.
We set budget k beginning from 1 to the maximum (denoted
by k˚) that makes spP, T q “ 0 for every greedy algorithm. As
shown in Fig. 3, with a given budget k, for any specific motif,
the SGB-Greedy achieves the lowest similarity meaning the
highest dissimilarity, because the SGB-Greedy greedily finds
every protector that can maximally increase the dissimilarity
scores of all targets. With local budget settings, the CT-Greedy
method is a bit better than WT-Greedy. For the two budget
division strategies, for a specific k, the K of TBD leads to
lower similarity than that of DBD, because the TBD allocates
higher sub budget for a target of higher initial similarity. TBD
is more efficient than DBD, but TBD needs to know the initial
similarity of every target in advance. RD method randomly
select protectors to delete and has the lowest performance.
Since the targets are randomly sampled from the existing links,
in the Triangle pattern case, it is very rare that one protector
participates in multiple target triangles. Thus, the RDT seems
to achieve very similar similarity score evolution of the three
greedy algorithms. For the Rectangle and RecTri patterns,
the RDT has worse performance than the greedy algorithms.
Moreover, the k˚ for Rectangle is the highest, and it confirms
1http://konect.uni-koblenz.de/networks/arenas-email
2http://snap.stanford.edu/data/com-DBLP.html
that it is more challenging in defending the Rectangle motif
based adversaries than the other two motifs related ones.
Similar results are obtained on DBLP graph. The experi-
ments on SGB-Greedy, CT-Greedy and WT-Greedy are exten-
sively long such that every of them didn’t finish in one week.
Then we show the results under the scalable implementations
as shown in Fig. 4. The similarity under SGB-Greedy-R and
CT-Greedy-R: TBD decreases faster than other methods.
It is interesting that for Triangle motif subgraph pattern,
all methods except for the RD and RDT can achieve very
near evolution of similarity score. This is because the number
of targets in our experiments is small, and for the triangle
subgraph patterns, there is a rare that two target subgraphs
share a common link.
Running time. It directly reveals the computing efficiency of
every algorithm. We compare the running time of all methods
on the Arenas-email and scalable ones on the DBLP.
As shown in Fig. 5, for the three subgraph patterns, the
running time of all normal greedy algorithms (i.e. SGB-
Greedy, CT-Greedy, WT-Greedy) is about 20 times more than
of the respective scalable implementations (i.e. SGB-Greedy-
R, CT-Greedy-R, WT-Greedy-R) on the Arenas-email graph.
For a specific motif, the running time of SGB-Greedy, CT-
Greedy and WT-Greedy is very close in accordance with the
analyzed time complexity.
On DBLP graph, we set |T | “ 50 and k “ 25. The
running time of the three scalable algorithms is within several
thousands of seconds for all subgraph patterns used in this
work, while the greedy algorithms without scalable implemen-
tations didn’t finish within a week. As shown in Fig. 6, we
compare the running time for SGB-Greedy-R, CT-Greedy-R,
WT-Greedy-R, RD and RDT methods. RD and RDT randomly
select protectors from the alternative links without calculating
the dissimilarity metric, which has the lowest running time.
Both WT-Greedy-R and CT-Greedy-R need to globally select
protectors with multiple times for every target and also has
high time consumption.
Utility analysis. Privacy preserving often reduces the graph
utility which is very critical for a released graph. Currently,
the graph utility is generally represented by many important
statistical graph metrics (see Table II).
TABLE II
THE MAIN METRICS FOR THE GRAPH UTILITY ANALYSIS.
Metric Notation Description
l The average path length for all node pairs
clust The average clustering coefficient [32]
r The assortativity coefficient [33]
cn The average core number of all nodes [34]
µ The second largest eigenvalue [35]
Mod The modularity metric of community structures [36]
1) Distance. Distance between any pair of nodes pu, vq is
a critical metric to evaluate end-to-end characteristic of the
graph, denoted by luv which is the number of passing through
links from node u to v. The average path length of a graph is
l “ řu,vPV,u‰v luv{pNpN ´ 1q{2q.
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Fig. 3. Experiments for the evolution of the number of existing target subgraphs as a function of budget k on Arenas-email graph.
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Fig. 4. Experiments for the evolution of the number of existing target subgraphs as a function of budget k on DBLP graph.
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Fig. 5. Experiments for the evolution of the running time as a function of budget k on Arenas-email graph.
2) Clustering Coefficient. Clustering coefficient [32] of a
node in a graph quantifies how close its neighbors are to
being a clique, which is mathematically defined by the notation
clustv “ |tw : w P Γu X Γvu|{pdvpdv ´ 1q{2q, where Γpvq is
the set of neighboring nodes of v. Then the average clustering
coefficient can be computed by clust “ řvPV clustv{N .
3) Assortativity coefficient. Assortativity [33] (or assortative
mixing) is a preference for a network’s nodes to attach to
others that are similar in some way, quantifying the degree
correlations. Assuming ϕij as the probability to find a node
with degree i and degree j at the two ends of a randomly
selected edge, and qi as the probability to have a degree
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Fig. 6. Experiments for the evolution of the running time as a function of budget k on DBLP graph.
i node at the end of a link, the assortativity coefficient is
r “ řij ijpϕij ´ qiqjq{σq2 , where σq2 is the variance of the
distribution qi.
4) Core number. The core number of a node v indicates
the node importance by k-shell decomposition [34], denoted
by cnv, and average core number of all nodes is cn “ř
vPV cnv{N .
5) Eigenvalue centrality. The Laplacian matrix is used to
find many useful properties of a graph, L “ D ´ G, where
the matrix D is the degree matrix in which Dvv “ dv , and
otherwise Duv “ 0pu ‰ vq. The eigenvector of Laplacian
matrix is µ “ tµ1, µ2, ¨ ¨ ¨ , µNu, and let µ represents the
second largest eigenvalue which can well describe the graph
property [3].
6) Modularity. Community modularity [36] of a network is
critical for describe the structure organizations for real rela-
tionship establishments. The community property of a graph
is evaluated by the modularity metric which is denoted by
Mod “ 1{2mři,jrGij ´ didj{2msδpci, cjq, where Gij “ 1
if node i and j are connected, di is the degree of node i, ci
is the community number to which vertex i is assigned, and
m is the total number of links in the current graph. δ-function
δpu, vq is 1 if u “ v and 0 otherwise.
To analyze the utility loss between the original graph and a
released graph, we use the utility loss ratio defined by
ulrpz,G,G1q “ |pzpGq ´ zpG
1qq
zpGq |
where zpGq and zpG1q represents a metric (listed in Table II)
for original and perturbed graphs respectively. The average
utility loss ratio for all utility metrics is
ulrpG,G1q “
ř
z ulrpz,G,G1q
# of utility metrics
In general, we hope all targets are perfectly protected such
that the adversaries can’t infer the existence of targets. This
can be achieved by deleting a protector set P which can result
in the total similarity to 0, namely
ř
tPT spP, tq “ 0. We treat
it as full protection for all targets.
TABLE III
COMPARISONS OF UTILITY LOSS RATIO FOR ALL GREEDY ALGORITHMS
ON Arenas-email, WITH |T | “ 20.
GzT SGD-
Greedy(-R)
CT-Greedy(-R) WT-Greedy(-R)
DBD TBD DBD TBD
Triangle 0.64% 1.95 % 1.95 % 1.95 % 1.95 % 1.95 %
Rectangle 0.64 % 2.49 % 2.53 % 2.47 % 2.60 % 2.38 %
RecTri 0.64 % 1.23 % 1.28 % 1.27 % 1.28 % 1.28 %
TABLE IV
COMPARISONS OF UTILITY LOSS RATIO FOR ALL GREEDY ALGORITHMS
ON Arenas-email, WITH |T | “ 50.
GzT SGD-
Greedy(-R)
CT-Greedy(-R) WT-Greedy(-R)
DBD TBD DBD TBD
Triangle 1.14 % 2.97 % 2.97 % 2.97 % 2.97 % 2.97 %
Rectangle 1.14 % 7.98 % 8.63 % 7.93 % 7.97 % 8.64 %
RecTri 1.14 % 3.14 % 3.54 % 3.15 % 3.46 % 3.11 %
In Table III and Table IV, we set |T | “ 20 and |T | “ 50
respectively for graph Arenas-email. For any specific subgraph
pattern, all greedy algorithms in this work can achieve the
goal of the full protections with very little utility loss. The
protection for Rectangle pattern needs deleting a higher num-
ber of protectors and causes a bit higher utility loss under
every greedy protection mechanism. With a higher number of
targets, more protectors are need for full protections at the
cost of a bit higher utility loss. Taking Triangle pattern for
instance, fully protecting 20 targets lead to 1.95% utility loss,
while protecting 50 targets causes 2.97% utility loss under the
SGB-Greedy(-R) algorithm.
TABLE V
COMPARISONS OF UTILITY LOSS RATIO FOR ALL GREEDY ALGORITHMS
ON DBLP, WITH |T | “ 52.
GzT SGD-
Greedy(-R)
CT-Greedy(-R) WT-Greedy(-R)
DBD TBD DBD TBD
Triangle 0.011% 0.014% 0.017% 0.017% 0.018% 0.018%
Rectangle 0.011% 0.016% 0.015% 0.015% 0.018% 0.018%
RecTri 0.011% 0.012% 0.016% 0.016% 0.013% 0.013%
In Table V, we show the utility loss for all methods on
DBLP graph. Because the DBLP graph is huge, and many
utility metrics such as the average path length and eigenvalue
can’t be efficiently computed on a general sever. Here we show
the results of clustering coefficient and core number, and the
results show that the graph utility loss is very tiny if a small
number of targets are protected by deleting a limited budget
of link deletion k “ 25.
The experimental results show that protecting key targets
in large social graphs is workable. Due to personal consid-
erations, if two users want to hide the link between them,
in order that the adversaries can’t infer the link existence
by analyzing a specific subgraph pattern that the two users
frequently participate in, our work can do efficient assistance.
D. Extended Discussion
To extend, a fully protected graph can defend a serial
of target subgraph related link predictions, for instance, the
Triangle based predictions including Jaccard [37], Salton [38],
Sørensen [39], Hub Promoted [40], Hub Depressed [41],
Leicht-Holme-Newman [41], Adamic-Adar [42], and Resource
Allocation [43], in which the prediction probability for every
target is 0.
However, if the dissimilarity employs the above-mentioned
metrics, the theoretical proofs for monotonicity and submodu-
larity are not satisfied. That is why we choose subgraph pattern
based dissimilarities. In the following, we discuss why these
mentioned metrics don’t have theoretical guarantees and why
the link addition and link switch are not workable.
Illustrations for other triangle related dissimilarity metrics.
We investigate the non-scalability in the link deletion process
of TPP for many other triangle related similarity indices [37]–
[43] including the Jaccard, Salton, Sørensen, Hub Promoted,
Hub Depressed, Leicht-Holme-Newman, Adamic-Adar, and
Resource Allocation.
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Fig. 7. An example for illustrations of the proof of other dissimilarity indices
including the Jaccard, Salton, Sørensen, Hub Promoted, Hub Depressed,
Leicht-Holme-Newman and Adamic-Adar. For simplicity, we assume there
is only one target T “ tpu, vqu.
1) Jaccard [37]. The similarity for node pair pu, vq is
defined by |Γu X Γv|{|Γu Y Γv|, where Γu is the neighbor
set of node u, and the dissimilarity function is fpP, T q “
1 ´ |Γu X Γv|{|Γu Y Γv|. As shown in Fig. 7, initially,
fpH, T q “ 1 ´ 2{5. Firstly, we discuss the monotonicity
of this dissimilarity function. Cases: a) only delete protector
p1, namely P “ tp1u, fpP, T q “ 1 ´ 2{5 “ fpH, T q; b)
P “ tp2u, fpP, T q “ 1 ´ 1{5 ą fpH, T q; c) P “ tp3u,
fpP, T q “ 1 ´ 2{4 ă fpH, T q. It can be inferred that the
monotonicity can’t be guaranteed, so the greedy algorithm can
not achieve near optimal results.
2) Salton [38]. It is defined by |Γu X Γv|{
?
dudv , where
du is the degree of node u, and the dissimilarity function is
fpP, T q “ 1 ´ p|Γu X Γv|q{
?
dudv . For the target link, the
initial dissimilarity is fpH, T q “ 1 ´ 2{?12. The cases for
deleting one protector: a) P “ tp1u, fpP, T q “ 1´ 2{
?
12 “
fpH, T q; b) P “ tp2u, fpP, T q “ 1 ´ 1{
?
8 ą fpH, T q; c)
P “ tp3u, fpP, T q “ 1´2{
?
8 ă fpH, T q. The monotonicity
can’t be satisfied.
3) Sørensen [39]. The similarity is defined by 2|Γu X
Γv|{pdu ` dvq, and the dissimilarity function is fpP, T q “
1´ 2|Γu Y Γv|{pdu ` dvq, and fpH, T q “ 1´ 4{7. Cases: a)
P “ tp1u, fpP, T q “ 1 ´ 4{7 “ fpH, T q; b) P “ tp2u,
fpP, T q “ 1 ´ 2{6 ą fp, T q; c) P “ tp3u, fpP, T q “
1´ 4{6 ă fpH, T q. The monotonicity can’t be satisfied.
4) Hub Promoted (HP) [40]. Defined by |Γu X
Γv|{mintdu, dvu, the dissimilarity function is fpP, T q “
1 ´ |Γu X Γv|{mintdu, dvu, and fpH, T q “ 1 ´ 2{3. Cases:
a) P “ tp1u, fpP, T q “ 1 ´ 2{3 “ fpH, T q; b) P “ tp2u,
fpP, T q “ 1 ´ 1{2 ą fpH, T q; c) P “ tp3u, fpP, T q “
1´ 2{2 ă fpH, T q. The monotonicity can’t be satisfied.
5) Hub Depressed (HD) [41]. Defined by p|Γu X
Γv|q{pmaxtdu, dvuq, the dissimilarity function is fpP, T q “
1 ´ p|Γu X Γv|q{pmaxtdu, dvuq, and fpP,Hq “ 1 ´ 2{4.
Cases: a) P “ tp1u, fpP, T q “ 1 ´ 2{4 “ fpH, T q; b)
P “ tp2u, fpP, T q “ 1 ´ 1{3 ą fpH, T q; c) P “ tp4u,
fpP, T q “ 1 ´ 2{3 ă fpH, T q. The monotonicity can’t be
satisfied.
6) Leicht-Holme-Newman (LHN) [41]. The similarity is
defined by |Γu X Γv|{dudv , and the dissimilarity function is
fpP, T q “ 1´|ΓuXΓv|{dudv , and fpH, T q “ 1´2{12. One
protector selecting cases are: a) P “ tp1u, fpP, T q “ 1 ´
2{12 “ fpH, T q; b) P “ tp2u, fpP, T q “ 1´1{8 ą fpH, T q;
c) P “ tp3u, fpP, T q “ 1´2{8 ă fpH, T q. The monotonicity
can’t be satisfied.
7) Adamic-Adar (AA) [42]. The AA similarity is defined byř
v1PΓuXΓv
1
log d
v
1
, and the dissimilarity function is fpP, T q “
C ´ řv1PΓuXΓv 1log d
v
1
, and fpH, T q “ C ´ p 1
log 3
` 1
log 4
q.
Cases: a) P “ tp1u, fpP, T q “ C´p 1log 2` 1log 4 q ă fpH, T q;
b) P “ tp2u, fpP, T q “ C ´ 1log 4 ą fpH, T q. The
monotonicity can’t be satisfied.
8) Resource Allocation (RA) [43]. The similarity is defined
by
ř
v1PΓuXΓv
1
d
v
1
, and dissimilarity function is fpP, T q “
C ´řv1PΓuXΓv 1d
v
1
, and fpH, T q “ C ´ p1{3` 1{4q. Cases
for random protector deletion include: a) P “ tp1u, fpP, T q “
C ´ p1{2 ` 1{4q ă fpH, T q; b) P “ tp2u, fpP, T q “ C ´
1{4 ą fpH, T q. The monotonicity can’t be satisfied.
Furtherly, we assume all protectors are iteratively sorted by
the number of participations in target triangles, and at every
step the protector of the highest value is selected. However,
the monotonicity or the submodularity can not be guaranteed
under the Jaccard, Salton, Sørensen, Hub Promoted, Hub De-
vĆ
(b) (c)
targets
p2
vĆ
p1
(a)
Fig. 8. An example for the proof illustration of Resource Allocation based
dissimilarity index.
pressed, Leicht-Holme-Newman, Adamic-Adar, and Resource
Allocation similarity indices. Here we take the RA similarity
as an example which is a bit more complex than others.
For multiple targets, the dissimilarity function of RA is
defined by fpP, T q “ C ´řpu,vqPT
ř
v1PΓuXΓv
1
d
v
1
.
Lemma 6. The Resource Allocation based dissimilarity
function fpP, T q is monotone. For any sets A Ď B Ď P ,
assume the protectors in P is iteratively selected as the link
of the highest participations in all target triangles, then we
have fpA, T q ď fpB, T q.
Proof. Deleting a protector p, only the score of the targets
(as in Fig. 8(b)) whose target subgraphs include the protector
will change. We assume θ is the number of targets whose two
end nodes have common neighbor v1. For instance, θ “ 1 and
θ “ 2 in Fig. 8(b) and Fig. 8(c) respectively. For any node v1,
initially, the similarity score is θ{dv1 ą 0. Deleting a protector
adjacent to v1, the degree of v1 reduces to dv1 ´ 1, and one or
more (i.e. y) target triangles are broken. Then for v1, the score
is pθ´yq{pdv1´1q. Due to y ě 1, then pθ´yq{pdv1´1q ă θ{dv1
(e.g. in Fig. 8(b), deleting any link will cause the similarity
score to be 0, less than the value 1/2 before deletion), the
similarity for v1 decreases, while the total dissimilarity will
increase. The monotonicity is satisfied.
We tried to prove the submodularity for the RA based
dissimilarity function. For an example, in Fig. 8(a), we assume
the sets A “ H, B “ tp1u, A Ď B and p “ p2. By the dissim-
ilarity function, initially, we have fpH, T q “ C ´ p3{6` 1q;
fpB, T q “ C ´ p2{5` 1{2q; fpB Y tpu, T q “ C ´ 1{4, and
fpA Y tpu, T q “ C ´ p2{5 ` 1{2q. In this case, we have
∆fpB, T q “ fpB Y tpu, T q ´ fpB, T q “ 2{5 ` 1{4, and
∆fpA, T q “ fpA Y tpu, T q ´ fpA, T q “ 3{5. It can be seen
∆fpA, T q ă ∆fpB, T q. The submodularity is not satisfied.
Illustrations for Link Additions. We define the dissimilarity
function by f 1pP 1, T q “ C ´řtPT s1pP 1, tq where P 1 is the
set of added links, and s1pP 1, tq is the similarity score or the
number of target subgraphs for target t. In fact, adding a new
protector p into the graph will never break the existing target
subgraphs. Then we have s1pP 1 Y tpu, tq ě s1pP 1, tq for any
target t in any subgraph pattern, namely f 1pP 1, T q ď f 1pP 1 Y
tpu, T q which indicates that the dissimilarity function is not an
increase function. The monotonicity property is not satisfied.
Then it is not necessary to check the submodularity property
of the objective dissimilarity function.
Illustrations for Link Switching. We define the dissimilarity
function as f#pP#, T q “ C ´ řtPT s#pP#, tq where set
P# is the switched links, and s#pP#, tq is the similarity
score or the number of target subgraphs for target t when
switching a set P# of links in the graph. Here we assume
the switching process is totally random. In general, a link
switching procedure can be accomplished by two steps: 1)
Randomly delete k existing links from the original graph; 2)
Randomly add k new links between the unconnected nodes’
pairs of the graph. If we first randomly select a link beyond
any target subgraphs, and then add a new link between a pair
of unconnected nodes. As discussed above, the dissimilarity
score might decrease. The monotonicity is not satisfied.
Moreover, we need to do more effort on the applications (e.g
fraud detection [44]–[46]) of the proposed privacy preserving
mechanism.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
To summarize, in this paper, we studied a novel target
privacy preserving problem which accurately focused on the
protection of important, private and easily attacked targets.
Only deleting all targets from the graph was insufficient to
defend the adversarial link predictions, and a set of protectors
were intensively eliminated to promote the attack defense
ability of all targets. With limited deletion budget, the optimal
protector selection is the key issue. Firstly, an objective
dissimilarity function was defined, where higher dissimilarity
scores means better protection. Secondly, we proved the opti-
mal protector selection is NP-hard, and then designed near
optimal solutions for two budget assignment scenarios: 1)
single global budget, where the SGB-Greedy algorithm can
achieve at least 1 ´ 1{e approximation; 2) multiple local
budgets, where the CT-Greedy and WT-Greedy algorithm
achieves an approximation ratio 1{2 and 0.46 respectively.
Thirdly, scalable implementations were done to improve the
running efficiency of proposed greedy algorithms. Finally,
the experimental results showed that all proposed greedy
algorithms can fully protect all targets at the cost of a bit utility
loss. Our work is general and can be used for any subgraph
pattern based privacy preserving.
We further explored many other similarity metrics as a
part of dissimilarity functions and tried to prove their mono-
tonicity and submodularity. We found that the dissimilarity
function which was defined by many widely used similarity
metrics such as Jaccard [37], Salton [38], Sørensen [39], Hub
Promoted [40], Hub Depressed [41], Leicht-Holme-Newman
[41], Adamic-Adar [42], and Resource Allocation [43] is not
monotone or submodular. In other words, the proposed greedy
algorithms of this work can’t be directly used to achieve near
optimal results for them, but the fully protected graphs of
our methods can defend all above adversarial link predictions.
Furthermore, we analyzed that the dissimilarity function of
this work doesn’t satisfy the monotonicity or submodularity
for link addition and link switch mechanisms.
To our best knowledge, this work is the first to focus on
target privacy preserving problem which is still open and chal-
lenging in real social graphs: 1) more TPP mechanisms against
kinds of other link predictions (e.g. Katz [47] index based
prediction); 2) target node privacy preserving technologies; 3)
applications into real trust systems or social graphs.
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